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I must confess that I had expected the rigorous analysis of
income-taxation in the utilitarian manner to provide an argument
for high taxes. It has not done so. [Sir James A. Mirrlees, An
Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation]
1 Introduction
The trade-o¤between redistribution and incentives has been analyzed exten-
sively by economists. A very important lesson extracted from these studies is
that if the government redistributes excessively, highly productive individuals
are left with little or no incentives to work. In order to avoid this, consump-
tion and income inequalities arise as a consequence of incentive problems.
Mirrlees (1971) was the rst study that formulated this problem in a
rigorous fashion. He nds that despite inequality aversion considerations by
the government, low marginal labor income taxes on a­ uent individuals are
desirable. Other studies, such as Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) rened one
of Mirrlees (1971)s assumptions and obtained the well known result that
the tax rate at the top of the distribution must be zero. These results may
be surprising, but the intuition behind them is quite clear: a high marginal
income tax induces leisure of highly productive individuals. This is very
costly for the economy as a whole in terms of forgone output. Thus, low
marginal taxes at the high end of the income distribution are optimal despite
redistributional considerations.
Having such a strong theoretical argument against, why is it that in
most of the countries marginal taxes on a­ uent people are high?1 One
explanation is provided by Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001). They obtain
positive asymptotic marginal taxes when the functional form describing the
labor earnings distributions upper tail is Pareto. However, the result no
1A recent article by The Economist reports that the highest marginal tax rates in
Belgium, Japan and Sweden are close to 50%, in Australia, China, France, Germany and
Italy are close to 45% while in Brazil, India and the United States are around 30%.
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longer holds if the previous condition fails to be satised.2
In this paper, I explore an alternative, yet mutually compatible hypothe-
sis: taxation on a­ uent individuals may occur in order to correct consump-
tion externalities. To formalize this idea, I model an economy populated by a
continuum of agents with heterogeneous privately-known productivities. Us-
ing a novel functional form, agentspreferences are interdependent.3 Thus,
agentsconsumption generates an externality in the form of a consumption
benchmark. This introduces an additional reason for government interven-
tion, namely, taxing income for corrective purposes. This occurs in absence
of a non-linear consumption tax. I derive a simple expression for optimal
taxes that accommodates consumption externalities within Mirrlees (1971)
framework. This expression decomposes the observed tax schedule into two
components: the Mirrleesian and the Pigouvian tax. Applying this formula,
I conduct a positive analysis of taxation: assuming that observed taxes are
optimal, I derive analytic expressions for i) a parameter that measures the
degree of agentsutility interdependence and ii) a function that quanties the
consumption externality agents of di¤erent income impose to society. Using
these expressions, I calculate the magnitude of consumption externalities that
rationalize labor income taxes in the United States and the United Kingdom
from 1995 to 2004. I show that only a moderate amount of what is known
in the literature as jealousy (see Dupor and Liu (2003)) toward a­ uent
individuals is su¢ cient to rationalize the observed labor income taxes in the
United States and the United Kingdom for the aforementioned period. This
result suggest that the progressivity of actual tax schedules may be driven by
corrective considerations, particularly at the top of the earnings distribution.
This is the main contribution of this paper.
If actual scal policy is supposed to be inuenced by positional concerns,
we need to gather empirical evidence in this regard. In this respect, there are
2I am explicit about this condition later in the text.
3A non-exhaustive list of economists who supported the idea that relative rather than
absolute consumption matters are Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949) .
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a few studies that have attempted to measure the degree to which relative
consumption matters for peoples satisfaction. Surveying individuals about
their choice among hypothetical worlds they could live in is one approach.4
In world A, the assets of the subject are higher than in world B. However,
agents are worse o¤ in world A than in world B with respect to the pop-
ulation average. Thus, individualschoices end up revealing their concern
for relative positions. For the sake of concreteness, most surveys focus on
particular assets such as cars, houses and leisure. In some cases, they also
include income. Using a survey applied to a representative sample of the
Swedish population, Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman, and Martinsson (2007)
nd evidence that supports the relative consumption hypothesis for income
and cars but not for leisure.5 Alpizar, Carlsson, and Johansson-Stenman
(2005) survey students from Costa Rica and obtain similar results. J. Sol-
nick and Hemenway (1998) survey a sample of American students and nd
that about 50% of them would prefer a world in which they had half their
absolute income as long as their relative standing was high.
An alternative and more common approach for testing utility interde-
pendence is applying a regression analysis. Using data on British workers
job satisfaction, Clark and Oswald (1996) construct reference groups that
comprise individuals with the same labor market characteristics such as age,
education, sex, monthly earnings and hour per week worked. They nd
that people are less satised with their jobs the higher the income of their
reference group is. Luttmer (2005) merges a database on individuals self
reported happiness to information about local (geographically speaking) av-
erage earnings and nds that self reported happiness is negatively a¤ected
by the earnings of others in their area. A non-exhaustive list of other pa-
4To be more precise, most of those surveys ask individuals where they would like an
imagined future relative of them to live in. According to Alpizar, Carlsson, and Johansson-
Stenman (2005), this in order to liberate them from current circumstances.
5Some of the results of this paper are striking. For instance, they nd that about 50%
of the utility obtained from cars and income comes from relative concerns.
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pers that have tested the signicance of othersconsumption or income on
individualswell-being are McBride (2001), Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005), Dynan
and Ravina (2007), Senik (2008) and Clark and Senik (2008). On social com-
parisons among family members, Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) nd that
a woman outside the formal labor force is 16-25% more likely to work outside
the home if her sisters husband earns more than her own husband. At an
experimental level, Rustichini and Vostroknutov (2007) conduct a burning
moneygame and nd that individuals are willing to incur a cost in order to
reduce the winnings of others. This occurs mostly when the winnings result
from skill rather than luck. Bault, Coricelli, and Rustichini (2008) conduct
an experiment in which participants choose among lotteries with di¤erent
levels of risk, and can observe the choice that others have made. Based on
subjective emotional evaluations and physiological responses, they nd that
individuals experience jealousy and gloating upon comparing their outcomes.
Regarding studies of optimal taxation under consumption externalities in
dynamic settings, the work of Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) presents a com-
plete markets dynamic economy driven by productivity shocks. The negative
externality they model is known as external habit formation.6 That is, when
agents increase their consumption, they do not take into account their ef-
fect over the aggregate desire of other agents to catch up. Nevertheless,
since the consumption distribution is degenerate in their model, the policy
implications that can be extracted are to prevent consumption addiction,
not jealousy itself. Abel (2005) models an overlapping generations economy
in which agents display jealousy toward the consumption of all living gen-
erations at a given period. When the social planner is more patient than
individuals, he nds that it is optimal to tax capital in order to transfer
consumption from old agents to young ones. This is true since the planner
wants to reallocate consumption toward later generations of consumers.
6External habit formation was rst introduce in the nance literature in order to explain
the equity premium puzzle. See Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Gali (1994), Heaton
(1995) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
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To the best of my knowledge, the only studies prior to mine regarding op-
timal income taxation à la Mirrlees under utility interdependence are Oswald
(1983) and Tuomala (1990).7 Both articles conduct a normative analysis of
taxation and characterize neatly optimal tax rules under the assumption
that agents value their consumption relative to the average consumption.
Oswald (1983) highlights that the zero marginal tax rate at the extremes
result no longer holds when agentspreferences are interdependent. This ar-
ticle also points out that higher taxes are optimal in a predominantly jealous
world while the opposite is true in an economy populated mostly by altruistic
agents. The numerical calculations of Tuomala (1990) also show that opti-
mal income taxes are progressive and that higher overall taxes correspond to
a higher degree of jealousy in agentspreferences. In contrast to my work,
neither article attempts to rationalize observed tax schedules. Another re-
lated paper is Ireland (2001) which introduces wasteful consumption through
which individuals signal their skills. The main result is that the optimal non-
linear tax schedule in this environment is higher but not more progressive
than without status seeking. Moreover, when the distribution of skills is
bounded, the zero marginal tax rates at the extremes result is una¤ected by
the signaling mechanism.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the model,
section 3 describes the data and estimation procedure, section 4 shows and
discusses the results and section 5 concludes.
7See also Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) for a classical study of a¢ ne income taxation
when individuals value their consumption with respect to the average consumption.
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2 The Model
Consider a static economy populated by a continuum of agents with hetero-
geneous productivity or skill. Let  2 , where   [; ] and 0 <  <
 < 1, be individuals productivity distributed according to the density
f : ! R++. Productivity is privately known to each agent. An agent with
productivity  has a utility function separable in consumptionand leisure
of the form
U(c; y; C; ) = u(c; C)  v
y


where c; y are individuals consumption and e¤ective labor, respectively.8
Moreover,
C 
Z

c() ()d (1)
is the societys consumption benchmark specied as a weighted average of
consumption. As usual, preferences satisfy uc > 0, ucc  0, v0 > 0 and
v00 > 0, and u() is jointly concave.9 I also impose the condition that uC < 0.
According to the previous specication, individuals value their own con-
sumption relative to what the rest of all individuals consume. Hence, the
so called reference groupin this economy is the whole society itself. Since
the utility of an agent decreases as the weighted average of consumption
increases, we say that preferences exhibit what is known in the literature
as jealousy. This is in line with the terminology proposed in Dupor and
Liu (2003). It is important to remark that according to (1), the weighting
function  () : ! R does not need to be equal to f().10 In other words,
8As standard in this literature, I dene e¤ective labor as y = l where l is the amount
of time worked.
9Utility specication such as u(c; C) = ~u(c   C),  2 [0; 1] with ~u0 < 0 and ~u00  0
satisfy those assumptions.
10Most of the literature on relative consumption valuation assumes that individuals
value their own consumption relative to the average consumption. In this case  () = f().
Examples of this are Oswald (1983) and Tuomala (1990). Abel (2005) is an exception since
this paper models an overlapping generations economy whose consumption benchmark is
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agents may contribute to the consumption externality that society faces in
a magnitude di¤erent from their population size. Hereafter, I will refer to
 () as the externality weighting function. For further reference, notice that
equation (1) can be reexpressed as
C 
Z

c()f()
 ()
f()
d (2)
hence the ratio  ()
f()
acts as a weighting variable of the consumption exter-
nality that the society faces.
An allocation in this economy is fc(); y()g2, where c :  ! R+
and y :  ! R+. Abstracting from government expenditure, I dene an
allocation fc(); y()g2 to be feasible ifZ

c()f()d =
Z

y()f()d (3)
Making use of the Revelation Principle, an allocation is incentive compatible
if
u(c(); C)  v

y()


 u(c(0); C)  v

y(0)


8; 0 2  (4)
Observe that since C cannot be a¤ected unilaterally by a single agent, it is
not a function of . An allocation that is incentive compatible and feasible is
said to be incentive-feasible. Finally, let g : ! R+ be the density according
to which individuals are weighted by the benevolent planner.
a weighted geometric average of the consumption of individuals belonging to two di¤erent
generations.
7
Denition 1. An optimal allocation is an allocation fc(); y()g2 that
maximizes the following planner problemZ


u(c(); C)  v

y()


g()d (5)
subject to fc(); y()g2 being incentive-feasible and C as dened in (1).
2.1 Characterization of Optimal Allocations
The following proposition states the necessary conditions that any interior
optimal allocation must satisfy. Let ()  v0(
y()

)
v00( y
()

)
y()

.
Proposition 1. Any interior optimal allocation fc(); y()g2 must be
incentive-feasible and satisfy
uc(c
(); C)
v0(y
()

)1

  1 =  ()
f()
+
uc(c
(); C)
f()

1 +
1
()


Z 


g(t)

  f(t)
uc(c(t); C)
  

 (t)
uc(c(t); C)

dt (6)


=
  R

uC(c
();C)
uc(c();C) f()d
1 +
R

uC(c();C)
uc(c();C)  ()d
: (7)
where
C 
Z

c() ()d (8)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that the previous solution collapses into the solution of a Mir-
rlessian economy with no consumption externalities when the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated to equation (1) in the maximization problem, , equals
zero. This is true since in that case uC(c(); C) = 0. In section 2.4, I make
assumptions that facilitate the interpretation of the previous expression.
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2.2 Implementation
Agents in this economy trade e¤ective labor for consumption. There is a
single rm that employs all agents. It produces one unit of output for every
unit of e¤ective labor, y. Every unit of e¤ective labor receives a payment of
w. Agents are also subject to an income tax schedule T (y()), assumed to be
twice di¤erentiable and to induce no bunching. Without loss of generality,
there are not taxes on consumption c. An agent with e¤ective labor y pays
taxes T (y()). Thus, taking as given T (y()), C and the wage w, the problem
solved by the agent with productivity ; 8 2  is
max
c();y()
u(c(); C)  v

y()


(9)
s.t.
c()  wy()  T (y())
c(); y()  0
Denition 2. Given a labor tax T (y()) and C, an equilibrium in this econ-
omy is an allocation fceq(); yeq()g2 and wage weq such that
i. (ceq(); yeq()) solve (9) 8 2 
ii. C =
R

ceq() ()d
iii. weq = 1
iv.
R

T (yeq())f()d = 0
v.
R

ceq()f()d =
R

yeq()f()d
9
An allocation fc(); y()g2 is implementable by the income tax T (y())
if fc(); y()g2 and w are an equilibrium.
2.3 Characterization of Optimal Income Tax
Dene the following tax mechanism T : y ! R,
T (y()) =
(
y()  c() if y() = y()
y() otherwise.
(10)
together with
T 0(y())
1  T 0(y()) =
 ()
f()
+
uc(c
(); C)
f()

1 +
1
()


Z 


g(t)

  f(t)
uc(c(t); C)
  

 (t)
uc(c(t); C)

dt (11)
if y() = y() and where 

follows expression (7).
Proposition 2. Any optimal allocation fc(); y()g can be implemented by
a tax schedule T (y()) dened by (10) and (11).
Proof. See Appendix A.
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2.4 The Quasi-linear Environment
In order to keep the model tractable and facilitate the interpretation of the
optimal income tax, I consider the case of
u(c; C) = (1  )c+ (c  C);  2 [0; 1); (12)
where C is dened as in (1).11 There are two important features to high-
light about this preference specication.12 First, the parameter  measures
positional concerns agents may have. As  approaches one from below, an
individual is almost as well o¤ consuming an extra unit or observing the con-
sumption of all other agents being reduced by the same amount. Conversely,
when  = 0, the consumption of others is completely irrelevant for an in-
dividuals satisfaction. Second, under the specication in (12), the shadow
price of aggregate consumption is 1 . That is, if all agents in an economy
were to consume one unit of the good, a share  of aggregate utility would
vanish due to the jealousy e¤ect. To see why, suppose all agents were to be
given one unit of the consumption good. Such consumption would provide
only 1  utils to an agent after she realizes that not just her, but all agents
are consuming an extra unit. Hereafter, I will refer to the term  as the
jealousy parameter.
To state the next proposition, let G()  R 

g(t)dt, F ()  R 

f(t)dt and
	()  R 

 (t)dt.
11Notice that this expression is equivalent to u(c; C) = c   C. Carlsson, Johansson-
Stenman, and Martinsson (2007) use a very similar functional form. The di¤erence is that
for them, C is the average consumption. They use this functional form to measure what
they call marginal degree of positionality. It is the fraction of the marginal utility in income
that is due to the increase in relative income, the term, c  C. For this specication, the
marginal degree of positionality is .
12See Hopkins (2008) for an excellent survey on theoretical models of relative concerns
and their relation to inequality.
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Proposition 3. Suppose u(c; C) = c   C;  2 [0; 1) and C dened as in
(1), then any optimal marginal income tax satises
T 0(y())
1  T 0(y()) =
[1 + () 1]
f()
[G()  F ()]| {z }
Mirrleesian tax
+

1  

 ()
f()
+
[1 + () 1]
f()
[G() 	()]

| {z }
Pigouvian tax
(13)
Proof. See Appendix A
From (13), it is easy to see that without utility interdependence ( = 0),
the optimal income tax is simply the Mirrleesian tax.13 Moreover, observe
that if g() = f()8 2 , the Mirrleesian tax is equal to zero. Atkinson
(1990) refers to this case as complete distributional indi¤erence and it arises
as the marginal utility is constant across agents regardless their consumption
level.
Regarding the Pigouvian tax, notice that it is increasing in the parame-
ter . The term  ()
f()
a¤ects this tax component since this is precisely the
magnitude that the Pigouvian tax corrects directly. But, what is the role
of the term G()   	()? If the planner redistributive taste is such that
G()  	()8 2 , then the Pigouvian tax will be reduced over its direct
component, the term 
1 
 ()
f()
. Conversely, if G()  	()8 2  then the
Pigouvian tax is higher.
Corollary 1 (Proposition 3). Marginal taxes at the top and the bottom of the
earnings distribution satisfy T
0(y())
1 T 0(y()) =

(1 )
 ()
f()
and T
0(y())
1 T 0(y()) =

(1 )
 ()
f()
.
This corollary makes clear that non-zero taxation at the top and the
bottom of the earnings distribution is optimal whenever  > 0. This is due
13See Salanié (1997) for a direct derivation of the Mirrleesian tax for a quasi-linear
model without consumption externalities. The quasi-linear case has also been analyzed by
Atkinson (1990) and Diamond (1998).
12
to corrective considerations. This feature of the optimal income tax when
preferences exhibit utility interdependence has been emphasize before by
Oswald (1983) and Tuomala (1990). Moreover, observe that unless  () =
f()8 2 , taxes at the top and the bottom do not need to be equal. These
features of the optimal income tax occur despite the Mirrleesian component
at the extremes being zero.
In Appendix B, I derive an expression for the asymptotic optimal income
tax when f() is distributed according to a Pareto distribution. A simi-
lar case (without consumption externalities) is analyzed by Diamond (1998)
and Saez (2001) based on the premise that the upper tail of the earnings
distribution can be well approximated by the aforementioned distribution.
Intuitively, the upper tail of the earnings distribution is thick. Such insight,
however, may need to be taken with caution after analyzing the very top
of the income distribution in the U.S. for several years using non-parametric
smoothing techniques. I show that the ratio 1 FY (y)
yfY (y)
, where y is labor income,
fY (y) is the density and FY (y) is the earnings c.d.f., has a decreasing shape
at very high labor income leves. This analysis is also presented in Appen-
dix B. This implies that the thickness of the empirical earnings distribution
may not be enough to explain positive taxes at the high end of the labor
income distribution as in Mirrlees (1971). Nonetheless, as seen in Corollary
1, positional concerns and corrective considerations can account for that.
2.5 Recovering the ExternalityWeighting Function and
the Jealousy Parameter
In this section I state and prove my main theoretical result. Put simply,
this result states that conditional on a social planners weighting function
g() and given a marginal income tax schedule T 0(y), gross income density
fY (y) and labor supply elasticity, it is always possible to nd the externality
weighting function  () and the jealousy parameter  that rationalize the
observed marginal income tax schedule. Given the imposed functional forms,
13
the strength of this result is the possibility it creates to apply the model to
the data.
Denition 3. The parameter  2 R and the externality weighting function
 :  ! R rationalize a marginal tax schedule T 0(y) if the resulting equilib-
rium allocation fceq(); yeq()g2 = fc(); y()g2.
Theorem 1. Suppose T 0(y) 2 C 8y 2 [y; y] with y > maxf0; ~yg, ~y = inffy j
(1   T 0(y))y 1 + T 00 > 0g. If u(c; C) = c   C, C = R

c() ()d,
v
 
y


= 1
1+
 
y

1+
;  > 0, then there exists a unique mapping
M : (g();; fY (y); T 0(y))! ( (); )
that rationalizes T 0(y). The externality weighting function  :  ! R and
the jealousy parameter  2 R that rationalize T 0(y) satisfy
 () = b() + (1 + )
Z 

b(t)
t1+
dt

(14)
where
b()  (1  )f()T
0(y())
(1  T 0(y()))  
(1 + )G()

+
(1  )(1 + )F ()

(15)
 =
R

f()
+1(1 T 0(y()))d  
R

g()
1+
dR

f()
+1(1 T 0(y()))d
(16)
and
f() = fY (
 1())
@ 1()
@
(17)
where (y) =
h
y
1 T 0(y)
i 1
1+
. If in addition,
R

f()
+1(1 T 0(y()))d  
R

g()
1+
d 
0, then  2 [0; 1).
Proof. If u(c; C) = c C and v(y

) = 1
1+
(y

)1+, it follows from Proposition
14
3 that
T 0(y())
1  T 0(y()) =

(1  )
 ()
f()
+
(1 + )
(1  )f()

G()  (1  )F ()  	()
(18)
where  () = 	0(). Expression (18) is a rst order ordinary di¤erential
equation of the form
 () + a()	() = b()
where a()   1

[1+] and b()  (1 )f()T 0(y())
(1 T 0(y()))   (1+)G() + (1 )(1+)F () . If
a() and b() are continuous on , according to Coddington (1989), Theorem
3, Chapter 1, 	() satises
	() = e 
R 
 a(t)dt
Z 

e
R t
 a(x)dxb(t)dt+ 

(19)
The fact that T 0(y) is continuous 8y 2 [y; y] with y > 0 guarantee the
continuity of a() and b(). By setting  = 0 in (19) we have 	() = 0 since
	() is a cumulative weighting function. Moreover, since  is an argument
of 	() in (19) through b(t), setting
 =
R

f()
+1(1 T 0(y()))d  
R

g()
1+
dR

f()
+1(1 T 0(y()))d
we obtain 	() = 1. Using
R

f()
+1(1 T 0(y()))d  
R

g()
1+
d  0, we get
 2 [0; 1).
The last step involves the identication of the skills distribution f()
from income distribution fY (y). For that, notice that from the rst order
condition of the consumers problem we have (1   T 0(y)) =  y

  1


and
hence,  = (y) =
h
y
1 T 0(y)
i 1
1+
. Therefore, f() = fY ( 1())
@ 1()
@
. The
fact that y > ~y guarantees the invertibility of ().
In order to gain insight into how expression (16) makes possible calcu-
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lating the jealousy parameter, , let us consider a very simple example.
Suppose that g() = f()8 2 . Thus, we are in a case of distributional
indi¤erence and as established before, the observed marginal tax T 0(y())
must be purely Pigouvian (see equation (13)). Further, let us assume that
T 0(y()) = T 08y 2 [y; y], i.e., society faces a at tax. Evaluating equation
(16), we obtain  = T 0. Thus, we recover the jealousy parameter from taxes.
We can then proceed to calculate  (), the externality weighting function,
using equation (14).
2.6 An Upper Bound for the Jealousy Parameter and
a Lower Bound for the Externality at the Top
As stated in Theorem 1, it is possible to calculate  () and  conditional on
the redistributive taste of the planner represented by the density g(). This
element, however, is non observable and thus the model I present has an iden-
tication problem. Nevertheless, it is possible to calculate an upper bound of
 under the loose assumption that society favors some redistribution. This
statement is formally expressed in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Let  F  fg :  ! R+ j G()  F () 8 2 g. Then
   8g 2  F , where  satises (16) and
 =
R

f()T 0(y())
1+(1 T 0(y()))dR

f()
1+(1 T 0(y()))d
=
EY [y
 T 0(y)]
EY [y ]
Moreover,
f() = argmax
g()
f j g 2  Fg
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 5. Suppose T 0(y())  T 0(y())8 2  with strict inequality
for some interval I  [a; b]  ; with a  , b <  then  ()
f()
> 1 8g 2  F .
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Proof. See Appendix C.
Two things need to be highlighted about Proposition 4. First, the calcu-
lation of the upper bound of the jealousy parameter  requires only observed
variables: the labor earnings distribution, the marginal tax schedule on la-
bor income and the elasticity of labor supply. Second, the upper bound
of the jealousy parameter is attained when the planner is utilitarian, i.e.
g() = f()8 2 . The intuition for this result is straightforward: when
the planner is utilitarian, there is complete distributional indi¤erence (given
the quasi-linearity in preferences) and the Mirrleesian tax is zero at any in-
come level. Thus, all taxation must be Pigouvian. Moreover, under the
assumption that societies redistribute, Proposition 5 nds a lower bound for
the contribution to the consumption externality at the top of the income dis-
tribution, the ratio  (
)
f()
. In other words, the weight by which the agent at the
top of the earnings distribution contributes to the consumption externality
must be strictly greater than one if observed income taxes are thought to be
optimal, partly due to corrective considerations. This implies that the aver-
age consumption may not be an accurate approximation of the consumption
reference point a society faces but rather a weighted average where the top
is weighted more. In the next section, I estimate the upper bound of the
jealousy parameter, , and the corresponding externality weighting function
 () for the U.S. and the U.K.
3 The Data
My numerical analysis was done for the U.S. and the U.K. This choice was
based on the public availability of micro-le tax data that I describe in this
section. For the U.S, I use the Statistics of Income (SOI) Public Use Tax
les elaborated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and distributed by
the NBER.14 The data consists of the information that U.S. citizens and
14See Internal-Revenue-Service (1995-2004).
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residents submit to the IRS through the 1040, 1040A and 1040EZ tax forms.
Cross-section samples of approximately 100,000 to 150,000 observations are
available for each year from 1960 to 2004. Such samples were designed to
make national level estimates by including a weighting variable to make up
for the stratied nature of the sample.15 In order to abstract from capital
holdings, the denition of gross income that I use is salaries and wages. This
is the entry of the 1040 tax forms specied as Wages, salaries, tips, etc. In
addition, I use the the marginal income tax corresponding to di¤erent income
brackets as a proxy of the labor tax schedule. The marginal income tax was
collected from the Tax Rate Schedulefrom 1995 to 2004 published by the
IRS.
For the U.K, I use the Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI) Public Use File
from the Economic and Social Data Service provided by the University of
Essex.16 These les are compiled by Her Majestys Revenue and Customs:
Knowledge, Analysis & Intelligence, and are based on information held by
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) tax o¢ ces on individuals who could
be liable for U.K. taxes. Cross-section samples of approximately 450,000
observations are available for each year from 1995 to 2004.17 The data set
also contains a variable that allows to obtain gures for the whole U.K.
population. I use the variable dened as pay that stands for before taxes
pay from employment net of benets and foreign earnings. Marginal income
taxes are collected from the Survey of Personal Incomes Public Use Tape
Documentation: Annex D: Rates of Income Tax: 1990-91 to 2004-05" located
in HM-Revenue-&-Customs (1998-2007). This is the variable that I use as a
15The General Description Booklet for the Public Use Tax Files (several years) indicates
that the sample design is a stratied probability sample and the population of tax return
is classied into sub-populations (strata). According to the same source, independent
samples are selected independently from each stratum. A weighting variable is obtained
by dividing the population count of returns in a stratum by the number of sample returns
for that stratum.
16See HM-Revenue-&-Customs (1998-2007).
17There is an extra le for the scal year 1985-1986. Moreover, the HM Revenue and
Customs: Knowledge, Analysis & Intelligence recently released the le for 2005.
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proxy of the labor tax schedule for the U.K.
3.1 Estimation of Gross Labor Income Densities
The period of analysis is 1995-2004 since I have comparable data for the two
countries during these years. Even though the model is static, taking into
account the gross income distributions over several years allows me to obtain
a more robustdistribution for each country calculated as
fY (y) =
1
10
2004X
t=1995
fY;t(y) (20)
To calculate fY;t(y) for t = 1995; :::; 2004, I selected the domain y > $100
measured in 2004 dollars. I calculated fY;t(y) using a gaussian kernel over
many points unequally separated, locating more points at the bottom of the
domain than at the top. This was done in order to obtain more accurate es-
timates from numerical integration while at the same time keeping moderate
the number of grid points.18 Income observations were weighted to obtain
population estimates.
Since income observations are more sparse as income is higher, I smoothed
the data after transforming it into a logarithmic scale. According to Wand,
Marron, and Ruppert (1991), this transformation is appropriate under the
presence of a global width parameter h and data being more sparse at the
top than at the bottom of its domain. Without this transformation, either
the data at the bottom of the distribution would be over-smoothed or the
tail would exhibit spurious bumps. The smoothing window or width for the
U.S. was set at h = 0:9 s:d:n 1=5, where n is the number of observations
and s:d: is the standard deviation of log(yi), for i = 1; :::; n.19 Silverman
18For both countries, the number of grid points was 5,000. Moreover, I also performed
my calculations using alternative kernel functions such as the Epanechnikov and Triangular
and results were almost identical. The latter was not surprising given the sample size. See
Silverman (1986). I use the trapezoid method for the numerical integration.
19Indeed, the formula suggested by Silverman (1986) is width = 0:9An 1=5, where
19
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Figure 1: Gross Labor Income Distribution in the U.S. and the U.K. 1995-
2004
(1986) indicates that such a choice of width performs very well in terms of
mean integrated squared error for a wide range of densities. For the U.K.,
I set h = 2  s:d:  n 1=5 since lower widths produced a bump at the top
of the distribution.20 Figure 1 shows the estimated densities. I follow the
convention to abbreviate 1000 dollars as k and a million dollars as M.
A = minfs:d:; iqr=1:34g, where iqr stands for interquartile range. For both countries and
all years, s:d: was lower than iqr=1:34.
20For the U.K., I rst used Silverman (1986) optimal bandwidth. However, the resulting
income density appeared to need further smoothing at the upper tail. To correct for this,
I increased the bandwidth sequentially until the income density looked smooth. This
explains the use of h = 2 s:d: n 1=5.
20
3.2 Estimation of Marginal Income Tax Schedules
For both countries, the marginal income tax that I use is the statutory one.
I use them as a proxy of the respective marginal labor tax schedule. For
the U.S., I collect the tax rates corresponding to di¤erent income brackets
as published by the IRS in the Tax Rate Schedule from 1995 to 2004. I
use the brackets corresponding to single people. To come up with a single
marginal tax rate schedule for several years, I express all tax rate schedules
in 2004 dollars and for every y, I take a simple average over the ten years
I collected data. To maintain the constructed tax rate as a step function,
I dene the boundaries of the brackets as the average boundary of yearly
brackets. For the U.K., I employ exactly the same procedure. This time,
I collect statutory income tax rates from the Survey of Personal Incomes
Public Use Tape Documentation: Annex D: Rates of Income Tax: 1990-91
to 2004-05" located in HM-Revenue-&-Customs (1998-2007). Figure 2 shows
the estimated marginal income tax schedules.
4 Results
In this section, I present my estimates of agents jealousy parameter, ,
and their contribution to the consumption externality, the ratio  ()
f() .
21 This
is done for the case in which the benevolent planner is utilitarian, i.e.,
g() = f()8 2 . In this instance, all taxation is Pigouvian or corrective
and the jealousy parameter attains its upper bound as shown in Proposition
4. That is,  = . Under the assumption that the American and British
societies redistribute, the jealousy parameter, ; associated with the ac-
tualplanners weighting density will not be higher than . The estimated
parameters are surprisingly moderate. For the American society, I estimate
us = 0:135 while for the British one, I obtain uk = 0:14. Thus, under the
21The estimation uses a continuous and di¤erentiable version of the marginal tax sched-
ule. See Appendix D for details.
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Figure 2: Statutory Marginal Income Tax in the U.S. and the U.K. 1995-
2004
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assumption that the respective planner is utilitarian, both societies seems to
have very similar positional concerns.
A more intuitive interpretation of the above numbers is the following: an
individual in the U.S. (U.K.) is at least as well o¤ between consuming what
she can purchase with one dollar (pound) than seeing the consumption of
others fall by what they can buy with 13.5 cents (14 pence). Alternatively,
if all agents in the U.S. (U.K.) were given one unit of the consumption good,
from the point of view of a given agent such a consumption would taste at
least like 0.865 (0.86) units after realizing that not only her but all agents
increased their consumption.
Now, the question is, what is the consumption externality contribution
by income in these economies? To answer this, I plot  ()
f() against the gross
income cdf, FY (y). I present my estimations under the assumption that
the planner is utilitarian and that  = 3 for both countries.22 That is,
the elasticity of labor supply is 1
3
. This choice is in line with the work of
Diamond (1998) who chooses  = f2; 5g for a model with no income e¤ects
and constant elasticity of labor supply.23
According to Figure 3, the ratio  (y)
f(y)
is, roughly speaking, increasing in
income for both countries. In other words, the contribution to the consump-
tion externality is higher the more a­ uent individuals are.24 More precisely,
the ratio  (y)
f(y)
in the United Kingdom is almost at and close to 1.75 from the
third decile to the 85th percentile of the gross earnings distribution. From
there on, it increases sharply reaching a level close to 4. For the United
States, this ratio is close to one up to the 5th decile of the gross earnings
distribution and then increases sharply reaching a level of around 2.5. This
variable exhibits another sharp increase at the very upper tail of the gross
22Evers, Mooij, and Vuuren (2005) nd that di¤erences in estimates of labor supply
elasticities across countries appear to be small. Both, U.S. and U.K. are included in their
sample of countries.
23This choice is based on the work of Pencavel (1986). The results are robust qualita-
tively and quantitatively to elasticities within this range.
24This result is in line with one of the ndings of Blanchower and Oswald (2004).
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U.K. 1995-2004
24
distribution where it hits a level close to 4. Not surprisingly, the ratio  (y)
f(y)
at the top of the earnings distribution is higher than one as stated in Propo-
sition 5. These estimations suggest that the average consumption may not
be an accurate consumption reference point but rather a weigthed average
where more a­ uent individuals are weighted higher.
5 Conclusions
In this article I have presented a model that rationalizes high labor income
taxes on a­ uent individuals: taxation at the high end of the labor earnings
distribution may occur due to corrective considerations. This happens in
the absence of a non-linear consumption tax schedule. Surprisingly, the esti-
mated parameters that capture what is known in the literature as jealousy
for the U.S. and the U.K. are moderate, yet producing quantitatively high
e¤ects over labor income tax rates.
Rationalizing observed labor income taxes as Pigouvian requires that the
consumption externalities exerted by individuals be increasing in income. In
other words, in the light of this model, observed income taxes in the U.S.
and the U.K. are optimal if more a­ uent individuals generate a higher con-
sumption externality than individuals with lower income and the government
corrects this externality.
In future work it is important to analyze, at least numerically, how robust
the results of this paper are once the quasilinearity assumption is abandoned.
It would also be interesting to explore to what extent the presumed higher
contribution of a­ uent consumers to the consumption externality is a result
of these agents having access to consumption goods with higher positional
e¤ects and the government not being able to tax these goods directly.25 This
line of research is currently being explored in Samano (2009). Further re-
25In Frank (2008)s terminology, a good is positional if its valuation depends highly on
the context.
25
search is also necessary to understand whether positional concerns are purely
instrumental as in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) and Postlewaite
(1998) or hard-wired in human beings. The latter is the hypothesis of
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2009). Finally, as Hopkins (2008)
points out, additional empirical research is needed to examine how the e¤ect
of others income varies across the income distribution. In this paper, the
parameter that captures this e¤ect has been kept constant across agents.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The rst step is to transform the continuum of incentive compatibility
constraints (4) into a rst order condition. Let
W (; 0)  u(c(0); C)  v

y(0)


(21)
A necessary condition for truthful revelation of type is @W (;
0)
@0 j0= = 0,
therefore it follows that
uc(c(); C)c
0() = v0

y()


y0()

8 2  (22)
Moreover, under truthful revelation W () = u(c(); C)   v

y()


and
hence,W 0() = uc(c(); C)c0() v0

y()


y0()

+v0

y()


y()
2
, which together
with (22) becomes
W 0() = v0

y()


y()
2
8 2 : (23)
FollowingWerning (2007), I dene the expenditure function e(W (); y(); C; )
to satisfy W () = u(e; C)  v

y()


. The planner problem can be reestated
as
max
W ();y();C
Z

W ()g()d (24)
s.tZ

e(W (); y(); C; )f()d =
Z

y()f()d (25)
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W 0() = v0

y()


y()
2
8 2  (26)
C =
Z

e(W (); y(); C; ) ()d (27)
The corresponding Lagrangian is
L(W (); y(); C; ; (); ) =
Z

W ()g()d 
Z

[(e(W (); y(); C; )  y()) f()] d
+
Z

()

W 0()  v0

y()


y()
2

d+

C  
Z

e(W (); y(); C; ) ()d

(28)
Using integration by parts, it follows thatZ

()W 0()d = ()W ()  ()W () 
Z

0()W ()d (29)
thus, we can reexpress the above Lagrangian as
L(W (); y(); C; ; (); ) =
Z

W ()g()d 
Z


(e(W (); y(); C; ) y())f()d
+()W ()  ()W () 
Z

0()W ()d  
Z

()v0

y()


y()
2
d
+

C  
Z

e(W (); y(); C; ) ()d

(30)
Assuming interior solution, it follows from rst order conditions that
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W ():
g()  f()eW (W (); y(); C; )  0()   ()eW (W (); y(); C; ) = 0
(31)
y():
 ey(W (); y(); C; )f() + f()  ()
2
v0

y()


1 +
1
()

 ey(W (); y(); C; ) () = 0 (32)
C :
 
Z

eC(W (); y(); C; )f()d +    
Z

eC(W (); y(); C; ) ()d = 0
(33)
together with the boundary conditions () = () = 0 and where () 
v0( y()

)
v00( y()

)
y()

. Moreover, implicitly di¤erentiating W () = u(e; C)  v

y()


we
have that eW (W (); y(); C; ) = 1uc(c();C) , ey(W (); y(); C; ) =
v0( y() )
1

uc(c();C)
and eC(W (); y(); C; ) =  uC(c();C)uc(c();C) . The result follows after manipulating
(31)-(33).
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Taking rst order conditions in agents problem we have
T 0(y())
1  T 0(y()) =
uc(c
eq(); Ceq)
v0

yeq()


1

  1 (34)
where Ceq =
R

ceq() ()d. Substituting (11) into (34) it follows that
uc(c
eq()); Ceq)
v0(y
eq()

)1

  1 =  ()
f()
+
33
uc(c
(); C)
f()

1 +
1
()
 Z 


g(t)

  f(t)
uc(c(t); C)
  

 (t)
uc(c(t); C)

dt
(35)
Since in equilibrium the government balances its budget, we must have
that Z

ceq()f()d =
Z

yeq()f()d (36)
thus from (35)-(36) we conclude that fceq(); yeq()g2 = fc(); y()g2.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. By quasi-linearity of preferences uc(c(); C) = 1. Thus, using expres-
sion (11), the optimal income tax satises
T 0(y())
1  T 0(y()) =


 ()
f()
+
1
f()

1 +
1
()

()

(37)
with
() =
Z 

[g(t)  f(t)   (t)]dt: (38)
By boundary conditions we have () = 0, henceZ

[g(t)  f(t)   (t)]dt = 0 )  = 1   (39)
which together with the fact that 

= 
1  which follows from expression
(7) when preferences are quasi-linear implies that  = 1    and  = .
Plugging the previous values into (37) and substituting into (38) delivers the
result after algebraic manipulations.
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B Asymptotic Tax in a Quasi-Linear Envi-
ronment
Under the assumption that  < 1 it can be seen from Corollary 1 that
T 0(y())
1 T 0(y()) =

(1 )
 ()
f()
. Hence, under a bounded distribution of skills I obtain
a non-zero taxation at the top due to corrective considerations. Proposition
6 exhibits the formula for the optimal marginal labor income tax as  goes to
innity. I consider the case of quasi-linear preferences, a constant elasticity
of labor supply and f() Pareto-distributed. The last assumption is used
based on Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001). Both studies obtain positive
asymptotic marginal tax rates, however these results depend critically on
f() being Pareto.26
Proposition 6. Suppose f() is Pareto distributed with parameter k > 0 and
that L1  lim!1  ()f() and L2  lim!1 g()f() exist. If u(c(); C) = c()  
C,  2 [0; 1), v  y


= 1
1+
 
y

1+
;  > 0 then T
01
1 T 01 =

(1 )L1

1++k
k

+
1+
k
h
1  1
(1 )L2
i
where T 01  lim!1 T 0(y()).
Proof. From Proposition (3) and simple algebraic manipulations we have
T 0(y())
1  T 0(y()) =

(1  )
 ()
f()
+
1  F ()
(1  )f()

1 +
1
()


[G()  (1  )F ()  	()]
1  F () (40)
Since f() is Pareto it follows that 1 F ()
f()
= 1
k
and since v(y

) = 1
1+
 
y

1+
we have that
h
1 + 1
()
i
= 1+ . Using the fact that L1  lim!1  ()f() <1
26For a Pareto distribution f() = k
k
k+1
;  2 [;1);  > 0; k > 0 and F () = 1 



k
.
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it follows that
lim
!1
T 0(y())
1  T 0(y()) =

1  L1+
(1 + )
k(1  ) lim!1

G()  (1  )F ()  	()
1  F ()
(41)
Using LHôpitals rule, lim!1

G() (1 )F () 	()

1 F () =  L2 + (1  ) + L1
and substituting into (41) delivers the result.
Corollary 2 (Proposition 3). If L1  1 and L2  1, then T 01  .
Proof. Trivial.
Figure 4 shows the ratio 1 FY (y)
yfY (y)
of the income distribution in the U.S. for
1992, 1993 and from 1995-2004. I include the years 1992 and 1993 since Saez
(2001) estimates a Pareto distribution parameter for labor earnings based
on these years. This ratio was constructed after smoothing the upper tail of
fY (y) using a gaussian kernel. The width was set at h = 1:36 s:d: n 1=5,
where the standard deviation (s:d:) and n were calculated for observations
exceeding 13.5 million dollars (expressed in 2004 dollars). Table 1 reports
the number of observations, n, in the sample exceeding that threshold.27
Table 1: In Sample Number of Gross Income Observations
Exceeding $13,500,000 (2004 dollars)
Year Observations Year Observations
1992 153 1999 486
1993 75 2000 666
1995 78 2001 405
1996 134 2002 261
1997 217 2003 282
1998 333 2004 391
It can be seen that at least for some years the ratio 1 FY (y)
yfY (y)
at the very top
of the distribution is decreasing. This fact indicates that the very top of the
27This amount is approximately equivalent to 10 million expressed in 1992 dollars. Saez
(2001) reports that starting at this income level the number of taxpayers in the database
is very small.
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income distribution of the United States may not be accurately represented
by a Pareto distribution. Moreover, a decreasing 1 FY (y)
yfY (y)
would imply a de-
creasing pattern of optimal taxes in the canonical Mirrleesian model. This is
indeed what Mirrlees (1971) nds since he assumes a log-normal distribution
of skills for which the ratio is decreasing. The model with consumption ex-
ternalities would deliver asymptotic non-zero optimal taxes even if the ratio
1 FY (y)
yfY (y)
is decreasing.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Observe that we can reexpress (16) as28
 =
R

f()T 0(y())
1+(1 T 0(y()))d + (1 + )
R

(F () G())
2+
dR

f()T 0(y())
1+(1 T 0(y()))d + (1 + )
R

F ()
2+
d + 1

1+
(45)
Thus,
 = max
G()
f j G()  F () 8 2 ; G0()  0; G() = 0; G() = 1g
28 To see this, observe thatZ

f()
1+(1  T 0(y()))d =
Z

f()T 0(y())
1+(1  T 0(y()))d +
Z

f()
1+
d (42)
Using integration by parts it follows that
(1 + )
Z

F ()
+2
d =   1

1+
+
Z

f()
1+
d (43)
Plugging (43) into (42) we obtain that the denominator of (45) is equal to the denominator
of (16). To see that the numerator of (45) is equal to the one in (16) use expression (42)
together with the fact that by integration by partsZ

g()
1+
d = (1 + )
Z

G()
+2
d +
1

1+
(44)
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Figure 4: Kernel smoothed 1 FY (y)
yfY (y)
ratio in the U.S. y  $13; 500; 000
(2004 dollars)
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To obtain G(), I solve the following maximization problem
max
G()
Z

(F () G())
2+
d
s.t.
G()  F ()8 2  (46)
G0()  0; G() = 0; G() = 1 (47)
Let me consider the optimization problem ignoring constraints (47). The
corresponding Lagrangian is
L(G(); ();F (); ) =
Z

(F () G())
2+
d +
Z

()[G()  F ()]d
The rst order condition with respect to G() is
1
2+
= () 8 2  (48)
Clearly, () > 08 2 . By the slackness condition, we must have
()[G()  F ()] = 0 8 2  (49)
thus, G() = F ()8 2 . Clearly this solution satises (47). Finally,
substituting g() = f() into (16) we obtain
 =
R

f()T 0(y())
1+(1 T 0(y()))dR

f()
1+(1 T 0(y()))d
:
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Making a change of variable using (17), it can be shown that
 =
R  1()
 1()
fY (y)T
0(y)
y
dyR  1()
 1()
fY (y)
y
dy
=
EY [y
 T 0(y)]
EY [y ]
(50)
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Since T 0(y())  T 0(y())8 2  with strict inequality for some in-
terval I, it follows from (50) that
 =
EY [y
 T 0(y)]
EY [y ]
<
EY [y
 ]T 0(y)
EY [y ]
= T 0(y())
where the strict inequality comes from the fact that a   and b < . Since,
T 0(y())
1 T 0(y()) =

1 
 ()
f()
it follows that 
1  <

1 
 ()
f()
, thus  (
)
f()
> 1:
D Constructing a Continuous and Di¤eren-
tiable Marginal Tax Schedule
In this Appendix, I construct a continuous and di¤erentiable version of the
statutory marginal tax schedule that I employ for my estimation of  (). I
base this procedure in an insight from Stokey (2008). Without loss of gen-
erality, I will focus on a continuous and di¤erentiable version of a statutory
tax schedule with two income brackets of the form
T 0(y) =
(
c1 if y  ~y
c2 if y > ~y
(51)
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Figure 5: Statutory and Smoothed Marginal Income Tax in the U.S. and
the U.K. 1995-2004
For  > 0, a continuous and di¤erentiable version of the previous steptax
is given by
T 0(y) =
8>>>><>>>>:
c1 if y  ~y   2
c1 +
2(c2 c1)
2
(y   ~y + 
2
)2 if ~y   
2
< y < ~y
c1 +
(c2 c1)
2
+ 2(c2 c1)
2
(2(~y + 
2
)y   y2   ~y2   ~y) if ~y  y < ~y + 
2
c2 if y  ~y + 2
(52)
Figure 5 shows the continuous and di¤erentiable versions of the statutory
taxes for the U.S. and the U.K. I use  = 9; 000.
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